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negligent tort, and simultaneously permit the actor to go scot free. The
other argument against permitting a plaintiff to profit by a full recovery
from the wrongdoer is valid, but ought not be conclusive. Nor should
the formal contention that, the burden of proof being on the complainant,
he fails to make out his case in these situations, prevail over the obvious
equities of the case. Drawing, at last, our analogy to the previously
considered cases of harmful consequences occasioned by multiple causa-
tion, it would seem not altogether infeasible to apply the suggested pro-
cedure of separating damage, and on this basis to assess the negligent
defendant, who by his tort has deprived plaintiff of an opportunity, albeit
it may be a meager one, to recover from an injury not originally inflicted
by the defendant, such sums as represent his proportionate contribution
to plaintiff's injury. That is, assuming the measure of defendant's lia-
bility to be represented by the unknown X, then, as the prospects of
recovery are to one-hundred, so will X be to the total of the damages
suffered by plaintiff. On this basis of computation defendant would not
be punished, for he would be paying no more than his tort cost plaintiff;
and plaintiff would not be unduly enriched, since his compensation would
be solely gauged with respect to the reasonable worth of his expectancy
of recovery under normal circumstances.
ROBERT H. JONES
PARTNERSHIP
DISSOLUTION AND ASSUMPTION OF DEBTS - EFFECT UPON
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS
A dissolution agreement was drawn up by Benjamin and David
Leiken, partners, operating as the Mansfield Beautician's Supply Co.,
wherein David Leikin agreed, for a consideration, to take over the assets
and assume the obligations of said partnership. The continuing partner
operated under the firm name for a five-month period, at the end of
which time he was adjudged a bankrupt in a proceeding brought by his
creditors. The State of Ohio filed a claim with the referee for sales tax
claimed to be due the state, under the authority of Ohio G.C. 5546-9a.
Part of said tax accrued prior to the dissolution of the partnership and the
remainder subsequent thereto. The trustee contended that if any assess-
ment at all could be made only that part which accrued subsequent to the
dissolution was a provable claim against the bankrupt, and that in any
case the state was not entitled to priority over general creditors, because
the sum due the state was not a tax but a debt. The District Court for
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the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, affirmed the finding of
the referee and allowed the entire claim as a preferred one under
sec. 64 -b, subsection 6 of the Bankruptcy Act. In re Leikin, (U.S.D.C.,
N.D. Ohio, E.D.), unreported (1938).
The trustee contended further that the claim should not be allowed
because of the doctrine of marshalling assets. In brief, the doctrine may
be stated as follows: The partnership creditors shall in the first instance
be satisfied from the partnership estate, and separate or private creditors
of the individual partners from the separate and private estate of the
partners with whom they have made private and individual contracts;
and the private and individual property of the partners shall not be
applied in extinguishment of the firm debts, until the separate and indi-
vidual creditors of the respective partners shall be paid, so that neither
class of creditors shall be allowed to trespass on the fund belonging to
each other, until the claims of that other shall have been satisfied. Rodg-
ers v. Meranda, et al., 7 Ohio St. 179 (1857); Brock, et al. v. Bate-
man, et al., 25 Ohio St. 6o9 (1874). The Bankruptcy Act recognizes
the doctrine. I I (I I U.S.C.A., etc.) U.S.C.A. sec. 23 (f).
An acknowledged exception to the rule is where there are not two
funds to be administered. Rodgers v. Meranda, supra; Grosvenor v.
A4ustin, 6 Ohio 103, 25 Am. Dec. 743 (1833)- In such case under
the Bankruptcy Law of 1867, the partnership and individual creditors
shared pari passu in the individual bankrupt's estate. In re Lloyd, 22
Fed. 88, 15 Fed. Cas. 717 (884); Inre West, 39 Fed. 203 (1889).
Since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and recognition therein of the part-
nership as an entity, the exception does not prevail. Tumlin v. Bryan,
165 Fed. I66, 91 C.C.A. 200, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 960 (19o8);
Farmers' & M. Nt. Bank v. Ridge Ave. Bank, 240 U.S. 498, 6o
L. Ed. 767, 36 S. Ct. 461, L.R.A. 1917A, 135, 36 Am. Bankr. Rep.
728 (1916). But it has been held that the doctrine does not apply
where an individual trades under a firm name and no partnership in
fact exists. Mayes v. Palmer, 2o8 Fed. 97, 125 C.C.A. 325, 31 A.B.R.
225 (1913); Johnson v. Williams, III Va. 95, 68 S.E. 410, 31
L.R.A. (N.S.) 406, Ann. Cas. 19 12A 47 (1910); Bixler v. Kresge,
169 Pa. 405, 32 Atl. 414, 47 Am. St. Rep. 920 (1879); Himmel-
reich v. Shaffer, 182 Pa. 201, 37 Ad. 1007, 61 Am. St. Rep. 698
(1897). The court in the principal case held that the doctrine was in-
inapplicable.
Where all the assets are transferred to one partner in consideration
of his promise to pay the liabilities, the validity of the transaction turns
upon the law of fraudulent conveyances. If no intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors appears, the creditors can not impeach the trans-
action, Stringer v. Stevenson, 240 Fed. 892, 153 C.C.A. 578 (1917);
In re Collier, et al., Fed. Cas. 3002 (1874); Pendleton v. Foley, 21
Ohio App. I1S, 4 Ohio L. Abs. 36 (1925); Tom, et al. v. First Nat.
Bank of Midland, (Tex.), 104 S.W. (2d) 130 (937); and the assets
become the individual property of the assuming partner. In re Long,
Fed. Cas. 8476, 9 N.B.N.R. 373 (D.C. N.Y. 1874); In re Lehigh
Lumber Co., et al., IoI Fed. 216, 4 A.B.R. 221, 2 N.B.N. Rep. 512
(19oo); 6 Remington on Bankruptcy, sec. 2902; In re Frazer, et al.,
221 Fed. 83, 34 A.B.R. 467 (D.C. N.Y. 1915); In re Hull, 224
Fed. 796, 34 A.B.R. 447 (1915). Even though such agreements are
entirely valid as between the partners themselves, they do not bind the
firm creditors unless they consent thereto. No act of the partners alone
can modify their liability on firm contracts. Rawson v. Taylor, 30 Ohio
St. 389, 27 Am. Rep. 464 (1876). The Uniform Partnership Act is
to the same effect: sec. 36 (1): "The dissolution of the partnership
does not of itself discharge the existing liability of any partner * * *."
Several different theories have been employed in construing the effect
of such dissolution agreements. England and several of the states have
held that such an agreement creates the relation of principal and surety
between the partners-the partner assuming the debts being the prin-
cipal, and the other the surety-and creditors who have notice of this
arrangement have been bound to respect the rights of the surety as in
other cases of suretyship. Rouse v. Bradford Banking Co., [ 1894] A.C.
586; Lindley on Partnership (ioth ed.) 301; Nelson v. Century
Indemnity Co., 65 Fed. (2d) 765 (1933); Dean v. Collins, 15 N. D.
535, 125 Am. St. Rep. 61o, io8 N.W. 242, 1I Ann. Cas. 1027, 9
L.R.A. (N.S.) 49 and note (19o6); Stanley & Gravtt v. Roberts
Bros., 31 Ga. App. 746, 121 S.E. 878 (1924); Drake v. Hodgson,
et al., I I8 Misc. 503, 194 N.Y. Supp. 874 (1922); Tillis v. Folmar,
145 Ala. 176, 39 So. 913, 117 Am. St. Rep. 31 (19o6).
On the other hand many courts deny that partners may, by any
agreement between themselves, alter the relation in which they stood
when the obligation was incurred, or impose upon the creditor any
limitations or obligations which were not an incident to the original
relation. Mclreavy v. Magirl, 123 Iowa 605, 99 N.W. 193 (1904);
Norman, et al. v. Jackson Fertilizer Co., 79 Miss. 747, 31 So. 419
(19O1); Grotte v. Weil & Co., 62 Neb. 478, 87 N.W. 173 (1901);
,lbernathy Rigby Co. v. MDougle, Cameron & Webster Co., 187
S.W. 503 (1916).
The Ohio cases have expressed both views. Some hold that the
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creditor is bound to recognize the suretyship relation. Paul, Dempsey &
Paul v. Ellison, i Ohio Dec. Rep. 67, I W.L.Gaz. 452 (1844);
Little v. Quinn & Co., i Cin. S. Ct. Rep. 379, 13 Ohio Dec. Rep.
6o9 (1871). However, the better considered Ohio cases hold that
mere notice does not reuire a firm creditor to recognize the surety
relation. Rawson v. Taylor, supra; Butler v. Birkey, 13 Ohio St. 514
(1862). The Uniform Partnership Act adopts the view that the obli-
gation of the retiring partner is discharged by the creditor's consenting
to a material alteration, provided he knows of the assumption agreement.
U.P.A. sec. 36 (3)- In effect, this binds the creditor to recognize the
suretyship relation.
All however agree that, if the creditor consents thereto, he accedes
to a conversion of the joint obligation into a suretyship. It has been held
that bringing an action is sufficient acceptance, Muller Lumber Co. v.
McCaffrey, 141 Iowa 730, ii8 N.W. 903 (I909), and acquiesence
may be after the continuing partner or firm becomes bankrupt. Regester
v. Dodge, 6 Fed. 6 (1881). The creditor may pursue his remedy
against his debtor. Carpenter v. Park, i9 Cal. App. (2d) 567, 66 P
(2d) 224 (1937). The trustee, as representative of the principal, can
not insist, in the principal case, that the creditor, the state, first seek
recourse against the surety.
As a second theory, the rights and duties of a firm creditor may be
so changed by the assumption as to create not a surety relation, but a
novation with the new obligation of the assuming partner substituted
for the former joint obligation. In re Lehigh Lumber Co., et al., supra.
To constitute a novation, a creditor must have expressly or impliedly
consented to the discharge of the retiring partner and accepted the prom-
ise of the assuming debtor. .Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 56
N.E. 875, 78 Am. St. Rep. 712 (19oo); Peters v. Kanzenback, 175
Wis. 602, I85 N.W. 197 (1922); Reclamation Co. v. Western
Brokerage & Supply Go., et al., 57 S.W. (2d) 274 (Tex. 1932);
Schloss Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, et al., 26o N.Y. 243, 183 N.E. 376
(1932); City. Nat. Bank of Huron, S.D., et al. v. Fuller, 52 Fed.
(2d) 870 (1931). If consent is found, a genuine novation takes place,
and instead of assuming the position of surety, the retiring partner is
completely released. Chase v. Brundage, 58 Ohio St. 517, 5' N.E. 31
(1898); First Nat. Bank v. Green, 40 Ohio St. 431 (1884). The
consent need not be express or formal. It may be inferred from words
or conduct reasonably justifying the conclusion that he has released the
retiring partner and accepted the continuing one in his stead. It is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. First Nat. Bank v. Green, supra; Walstrom v.
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Hopkins, 103 Pa. 118 (1883); Bowyer v. Knapp & Martin, 15
W. Va. 277 (1879); Nightingale v. Chafee, ii R.1. 609, 23 Am.
Rep. 531 (1877). "And by the great weight of authority, the release
of the original debtor may be subsequent to the agreement." L.R.A.
1918B, 113, and cases cited.
It has been held that the mere institution of an action by the
creditor against the new debtor is not sufficient to establish his consent
to the novation and the intent to discharge the original debtor. Leckie v.
Bennett, 16o Mo. App. 145, 141 S.W. 7o6 (1911); Styron v. Bell,
53 N. C. 222 (186o) ; North Western Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Eddle-
man, 247 Ky. 116, 56 S.W. (2d) 561 (932), unless a demand of
payment preceded the institution of the suit. Leckie v. Bennett, supra;
Wood v. Moriaty, 15 R. I. 518, 9 Atl. 427 (1887); Tysen v. Somer-
ville, 35 Fla. 219, 17 So. 567 (1895). But other authorities hold that
the bringing of such an action is a sufficient assent to the agreement.
Rawle v. Skipworth, 19 La. 207 (1841); Dunn v. Clinchfield Ry.,
19 Fed. (2d) Sio, aff'd, 40 Fed. (2d) 586 (1927).
It has also been held that if the assuming partner becomes insolvent,
and the creditor proves his claim against his separate estate, as in the
principal case, he thereby elects to treat him as his sole debtor, and dis-
charges the other partner. Bucklin v. Bucklin, 97 Mass. 256 (1887);
Osborn v. Osborn, et al., 36 Md. 42 (1877); Baum, et al. v. Fryrear,
85 Mo. 151 (1884). Uponthe basis of the foregoing authorities, the
court could reasonably have held that the State of Ohio novated the debt
by filing its claim with the referee.
As a third solution, the assumption agreement is occasionally con-
strued as a promise to pay the debt of the promisee, and the firm creditor
is permitted to sue the promisor under the third party beneficiary doc-
trine. North Western Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Eddleman, supra. This
promise runs to the promisee, whereas in the case of a novation the
promise runs directly to the creditor. The general rule is that, even
though acceptance is to be deemed necessary, the bringing of an action
by a third person is sufficient. McCoy v. McCoy, 32 Ind. App. 38,
69 N.E. 193, 1o2 A.L.R. 223; Peterson v. Chicago, etc. R-. R, 119
Wis. 197, 96 N.W. 532, IOO Am. St. Rep. 879 (903); Smith v.
Pfluger, 126 Wis. 253, 105 N.W. 476, iO Am. St. Rep. 911, 2
L.R.A. (N.S.) 783 (1905); Reclamation Co. v. Western Brokerage
& Supply Co., et al., supra.
The assuming partner, therefore, became severally liable on the new
promise, and the creditor as beneficiary may hold him thereon. In re
Downing, Fed. Cas. 4044 (1870). The creditor need not be desig-
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nated. Bessemer Savings Bank v. Rosenbaum Grocery CO., 137 Ala.
530, 34 So. 609 (1902). See annotation 71 Am. St. Rep. 176.
Ohio has recognized contracts for the benefit of third persons,
Thompson v. Thompson, 4 Ohio St. 333 (1854); Emmitt v. Brophy,
42 Ohio St. 82 (1884), but they have not done so as yet in cases
involving assumption of partnership debts. This argument was advanced
in the principal case, and it could have reasonably been the basis of the
decision had the court seen fit to so use it.
It was essential for the State of Ohio to evade the doctrine of
marshalling assets in order to share with the individual bankrupt's cred-
itors, and to prove the entire claim against the assuming partner's estate.
The evasion could have been accomplished on any one of the three
aforementioned theories; that is, upon the theory that the retiring partner
became a surety, on the theory that the retiring partner was discharged
by reason of a novation, or on the theory that the state became a third
party beneficiary by reason of the assumption agreement.
MARGARETTA BEYNON
PRIVACY
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Maxine Martin, an actress, sued the F.I.Y. Theatre Company for
damages on two causes of action: (I) "Violation or breach of the right
of privacy;" (2) Libel. She alleged that her picture was, without her
permission, displayed by defendant in front of a burlesque house along
with other pictures of "lewd and nude burlesque actresses"; that she
was not under contract to defendant and did not intend to appear in his
or any other burlesque theatre. She further alleged that the reputation
of burlesque shows is of a low type both in her profession and in the
public mind, and that such unauthorized display of her picture injured
her in her profession. The Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County
sustained a demurrer to the first cause of action, without disposing of
the second cause, taking it for granted that plaintiff might proceed with
her action for libel.1 In sustaining the demurrer, the court, speaking
through Judge Merrick, decided, in the absence of any authority in
Ohio, that privacy was a personal and not a property right, and that "it
does not exist under any theory where the person has become prominent,
notorious or well-known so that by his very vocation or conduct he has
dedicated his life to some continued contact with the public and thereby
'Maxine Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., io Ohio 0. 338 (1938)
